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Freedom of Association in the Australian 
Constitution and the Crime of Consorting  
ANTHONY GRAY * 
Abstract 
While the High Court’s jurisprudence on the implied freedom of political 
communication has been well-developed in the past 20 years, there has 
been much less focus on the question of an implied freedom of political 
association, or a freedom to associate more generally. Cases that 
concerned association rights have been decided on other grounds. 
However, the recent re-introduction of consorting laws in New South 
Wales and Queensland, and the likely constitutional challenge to them, 
would require the High Court to directly address the question of the 
extent, if any, to which political association is protected by the Australian 
Constitution, and, perhaps, the continued workability of the distinction 
between communication and association that is ‘political’ (however 
defined), and communication and association that is not political. This 
article addresses the issue of the extent to which the Australian 
Constitution does and should protect an implied freedom of political 
association, or association more generally. It argues the New South Wales 
consorting provisions may be unacceptably broad, making no distinction 
between associations for sinister purposes, and associations for non-
sinister purposes. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The High Court of Australia’s jurisprudence on the extent to which 
constitutional freedom of association rights exist remains in an 
underdeveloped state; the cases potentially concerning that freedom being 
decided on other grounds. This void becomes important given a recent 
move by the Parliament of New South Wales to update its criminal 
provisions dealing with consorting. This new provision (s 93X Crimes 
Act 1900 (NSW)) and a recent move by the Queensland Parliament in 
October 2013 to criminalise association among members of twenty-six 
declared ‘criminal organisations’ (all motorcycle clubs) (s 60A Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld)) highlight the need for development of the law. These 
new provisions reflect a trend away from traditional criminal law 
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approaches focussing on past behaviour and its consequences, and 
increasingly towards a policy of attempting to stop criminal behaviour 
before it occurs.1 Walker writes that in a post-2001 world, no-one is sure 
who one’s enemies are, so the net of those considered worthy of suspicion 
and investigation grows wider.2  
These consorting laws implicate important human rights. In this article, I 
will focus on the freedom of association contemplated by the Australian 
Constitution and consider the extent to which such a freedom might be 
used to challenge anti-association legislation, using the consorting laws as 
an example. As we will see, the principles relating to freedom of 
association in Australia are limited to dicta by members of the High Court 
in some of the case law. The High Court has recognised for 
approximately 20 years that an implication of freedom of political 
communication can be deduced from the structure of the Constitution and 
its premise of representative democracy. Some judges have recognised 
that this freedom must necessarily include a right to associate. However, 
it has not been necessary in the case law on the implied freedom to date to 
consider this right to associate in great detail. Freedom of association has 
not formed the basis of any decision to date. However, this could change 
with a constitutional challenge to laws such as those which criminalise 
the very act of association. I will argue that by extension of existing 
Australian case law on the implied freedom of political communication, 
these laws are constitutionally vulnerable. I will use the recently enacted 
New South Wales laws as the prime exemplar, but make appropriate 
references to the laws in other jurisdictions as well. 
The consideration of such issues in the Australian constitutional context 
would be assisted by a consideration of how similar issues have been 
dealt with in comparable jurisdictions; I will examine what can be drawn 
from the overseas authorities that have attempted to balance public safety 
concerns with freedom of association principles. I will argue that the 
High Court could draw support for its conclusion that the freedom of 
political communication implicates freedom of association from overseas 
case law, albeit developed in a different statutory and constitutional 
context. 
                                                           
1
 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Social Control and Anti-Social Behaviour: The Subversion of 
Human Rights’ (2004) 120 Law Quarterly Review 263; Andrew Ashworth and Lucia 
Zedner ‘Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, 
Procedure and Sanctions’ (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21. 
2
 Clive Walker, ‘Know Thine Enemy as Thyself: Discerning Friend from Foe Under Anti-
Terrorism Laws’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 275, 276; Lucia Zedner, 
‘Seeking Security by Eroding Rights: The Side-Stepping of Due Process’ in Ben Goold 
and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Oxford, 2007). 
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In Part II of the article, I discuss the development of the implied freedom 
of association in Australian law. In Part III, I consider dimensions of such 
a freedom, including theoretical perspectives, and overseas perspectives. 
In Part IV, I outline the consorting provisions currently operative 
throughout Australia, before in Part V considering problematic aspects of 
the consorting laws in Australia if the High Court were to recognise the 
constitutionally implied freedom of association and the international 
learning. This analysis will assist in the development of the freedom of 
association jurisprudence in Australia.  
II FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN AUSTRALIA3  
In the early 1990s, the High Court of Australia recognised an implication 
from the system of representative government for which the Constitution 
provides.4 The Court found that a necessary feature of the system of 
representative government contemplated by s 7 and s 24 of the Australian 
Constitution was an implied freedom of ‘political’ communication, so 
that individuals had broad freedom to discuss and hear opinions about 
political matters. This includes communication between electors and the 
elected, as well as between electors.5 
Mason CJ, for instance, in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (‘ACTV’)6 stated that freedom of communication was 
indispensable to the ‘accountability and responsibility’ of representative 
government. Only by exercising such a freedom could the citizen 
communicate their views on the wide range of matters that may call for 
political action or decision.7 The freedom was not absolute, but any law 
                                                           
3
 Some claim that the Communist Party Case (Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1)) is an example of the High Court upholding freedom of 
association principles: Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 605 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow Hayne and Heydon JJ). Some care needs to be taken with this 
position, given the High Court found the legislation invalid in that case because of the lack 
of a head of power, rather than upon a more general human rights principle; see George 
Winterton, ‘The Significance of the Communist Party Case’ (1992) 18 Melbourne 
University Law Review 630. Dixon J did speak of the ‘right of association’ in that case 
(200); obviously he was not referring to a constitutional implication of the right of 
association, and this was not the basis of the decision of the court in that case. 
4
 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide 
News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1. The term used was ‘representative government’ 
(Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137 (Mason 
CJ), 168 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 228 (McHugh J) and/or ‘representative democracy’ 137 
(Mason CJ) and 210 (Gaudron J)). It is not thought that there is a great substantive 
difference between the two concepts. For interesting commentary on the precise meaning 
of ‘democracy’ here, see Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Representative 
Democracy’ (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 37, 44-49. 
5
 Aid/Watch Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539, 556 (French CJ 
Gummow Hayne Crennan and Bell JJ).  
6
 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
7
 Ibid 138. 
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that derogated from that freedom had to be justified as being reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to a legitimate objective in a manner compatible 
with the constitutionally enshrined system of representative and 
responsible government.8 The freedom was negative in nature, in terms of 
a freedom from interference, rather than a source of positive rights. It is 
not confined to the federal level,9 and protects various types of 
communication, including non-verbal.10 
In the Lange decision,11 the High Court developed a two-stage test to 
determine the validity of laws challenged under the principles developed 
in ACTV: 
a) Does the law effectively burden freedom of communication 
about government or political matters either in its terms, 
operation or effect? 
b) If the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner12 
which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative and responsible government? 
There is conjecture about the precise meaning of ‘political’ in this 
context.13 The cases have shown that advertising during election 
campaigns is clearly a form of political communication,14 as is discussion 
of public officials or public organisations,15 protesting at duck hunting 
                                                           
8
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. The specific two-
limb test was (a) does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about 
government or political matters either in terms, operation or effect, and if so (b) whether 
the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which 
is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative and responsible government; if the answer to the first was yes and the 
second no, the law would be invalid (567-568, Brennan CJ, Dawson Toohey Gaudron 
McHugh Gummow and Kirby JJ); the italicised words were substituted into the test by a 
majority in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1. 
9
 Stephens v Western Australia Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211; French CJ in Hogan 
v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [48]. 
10
 Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
11
 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567-568 (Brennan 
CJ Dawson Toohey Gaudron McHugh Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
12
 The italicised words were substituted into the two-limb test by a majority of the Court in 
Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 50 (McHugh J), 77-78 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 82 
(Kirby J). 
13
 In Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 30 Gleeson CJ noted the vagueness of the 
concept (the case involving an individual handing out pamphlets accusing a named police 
officer of being corrupt). The parties conceded in that case that such communication was 
‘political’; Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [335] (Crennan Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
14
 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
15
 Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 106. 




 and religious speech.17 Given that public allegations against a 
police officer have been considered to be ‘political’ communication,18 as 
have anti-war letters sent to soldiers’ families,19 it is submitted that a 
narrow view should not be taken of the meaning of ‘political’ here,20 but 
its precise limits are unknown. 
A distinction has been drawn between laws which directly interfere with 
freedom of communication about political matters, and laws which 
indirectly or incidentally impact on political communication.21 Laws of 
the former category are more difficult to justify in terms of the second 
limb of the Lange test.  
The Court will consider, in the balancing process involved at the second 
stage of the application of the Lange test, questions of proportionality,22 
and specifically whether there are less drastic means by which the 
legitimate objectives of the law could be achieved. The word ‘drastic’ in 
this context implicitly considers the impact of the law on fundamental 
human rights. The fact that means less invasive of fundamental human 
rights were/are available, but not adopted, may make it more likely that 
the more invasive path chosen by the legislature will be 
unconstitutional.23 
While these comments directly concerned political communication, they 
may also apply to political association. Freedom of association is clearly 
contemplated by the implied freedom of ‘political’ communication. This 
                                                           
16
 Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
17
 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197 
(conceded). 
18
 Coleman v Power (2004) 189 CLR 579. 
19
 Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259. 
20
 Recently in Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 
ALR 197, French CJ indicated a broad view should be taken of communications that are 
‘political’ in nature: [67]. He made the same remark in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 
506, [49], indicating there that it arguably included social and economic features of 
Australian society, given they were matters at least potentially within the purview of 
government.  
21
 This distinction was first drawn in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 143 (Mason CJ) and 235 (McHugh J) (similar to the 
distinction drawn in the United States literature between content-based and non content-
based restrictions); see also Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555 (Gummow Hayne 
Heydon Crennan Kiefel and Bell JJ); Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 16 
(French CJ Gummow Hayne Crennan Kiefel and Bell JJ); Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 
ALR 259, [64] (French CJ). 
22
 Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [282] (Crennan Kiefel and Bell JJ); Jeremy 
Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality’ 
(1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1. 
23
 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197, [206] 
(Crennan and Kiefel JJ) (if the alternative means are equally practicable); Monis v The 
Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [347] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (if the alternative means 
are ‘obvious and compelling’). 
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is because if the implied freedom of political communication includes the 
right of individuals to discuss issues, as the High Court said in ACTV, the 
individuals must discuss them with someone else. An association right is 
implicit. There is substantial academic support for such a suggestion.24 
George Williams has argued that freedom of association is fundamental 
to the system of representative government contemplated by ss 7 and 24 
of the Constitution: 
Freedom of speech and association have generally been an integral and 
accepted part of the process whereby the Australian people choose their 
representatives 25… it is difficult to see how some version of a freedom to 
associate could not be implied given the approach of the majority in 
McGinty and the existence of a freedom of political discussion. The 
ability to associate for political purposes is obviously a cornerstone of 
representative government in Australia. How could the people directly 
choose their representatives if denied the ability to form political 
associations? ... A freedom to associate for political purposes is likely to 
be a basic element of the system of representative government established 
by the Constitution.26 
However, Australian judges have not had to decide whether such a 
freedom exists. In the leading Canadian case on freedom of association,27 
its links with democracy were noted. Dickson CJ and Wilson J described 
freedom of association as a fundamental freedom and an indispensable 
condition of any free and democratic society.28 McIntyre J said freedom 
of association rights were the one human right clearly distinguishing a 
totalitarian state from a democratic one.29  
On several occasions members of the High Court of Australia have 
referred to an apparent freedom of association as being part of or closely 
                                                           
24
 George Williams, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 194; Joo Cheong-Tham, ‘Possible Constitutional Objections to the Powers to 
Ban ‘Terrorist’ Organisations (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
482, 495: ‘the question whether a freedom of political association should be implied from 
the Constitution has yet to be settled by the High Court. Such an implication can be 
plausibly argued’; Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Representative 
Democracy’ (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 38, 55: ‘freedom of association may flow 
logically from free speech … freedom of association is essential to representative 
democracy’; see also Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 US 234, 250 (1957) where four 
justices agreed that freedom of association was inherent in democracy. 
25
 George Williams,’Sounding the Core of Representative Democracy: Implied Freedoms 
and Electoral Reform’ (2006) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 848, 856. 
26
 Ibid 861. 
27
 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta)[1987] 1 S.C.R 313, [22] 
(dissenting in the result). 
28
 Ibid [22] (dissenting in the result). 
29
 Ibid [154] (quoting Paul Cavalluzzo, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain 
Collectively’ in Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Carswell, 1986). 
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related to the freedom of political communication. These include one of 
the two pioneering cases involving the implied freedom of political 
communication, ACTV,30 where Gaudron J suggested that representative 
democracy which underpinned the Constitution might require freedom of 
association,31 and McHugh J said that freedom of association was 
inherent in the requirements of s 7 and s24 of the Constitution.32 Other 
judges in those cases quoted work of others in a way that might suggest 
they would be favourably disposed to an implication of freedom of 
association.33 However, they did not expressly adopt such a freedom. 
In Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission,34 Gummow and 
Hayne JJ conceded that freedom of association may ‘to some degree be a 
corollary of the freedom of communication formulated in Lange and 
subsequent cases’;35 McHugh reiterated his agreement with the 
principle,36 and Kirby J agreed with the principle.37  
                                                           
30
 (1992) 177 CLR 106; the sister case being Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1. 
31
 ACTV, 212; Gaudron J seemed to be suggesting the implied freedom of communication 
was not necessarily limited to the political context, stating that the ‘notion of a free society 
governed in accordance with the principles of representative democracy may entail 
freedom of movement, freedom of association, and perhaps, freedom of speech generally 
(emphasis added). Mason CJ might have entertained a similar view, holding that freedom 
of communication was essential to representative government, ‘at least in relation to public 
affairs and political discussion’ (138) (emphasis added). 
32
 Ibid 232; these judges reiterated their support for freedom of association in Kruger v 
Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 115 (‘freedom of political communication depends on 
human contact and entails at least a significant measure of freedom to associate with 
others) (Gaudron J), and 142 (‘the reasons that led to the drawing of the implication of 
freedom of communication lead me to the conclusion that the Constitution also necessarily 
implies that the people must be free from laws that prevent them from associating with 
other persons’) (McHugh J). Toohey J also accepted the principle, finding that freedom of 
association was an ‘essential ingredient of political communication’ (91). 
33
 In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, Mason 
CJ stated ‘in truth, in a representative democracy, public participation in political 
discussion is a central element of the political process’. Then he said Archibald Cox made 
a similar point, quoting him in a passage referring expressly to freedom of association. It is 
considered to be a reasonable interpretation of this narrative that Mason CJ would have 
supported an implied freedom of association, at least for political purposes. In Nationwide 
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, Deane and Toohey JJ noted that suppression of 
criticism of government or government officials removed an important safeguard on the 
claim of individuals to live peacefully and with dignity in an ordered and democratic 
society. Then they quoted Hughes CJ in De Jonge v Oregon 299 US 353, 365 (1936) who 
discussed the importance of free assembly in order to maintain free political discussion, so 
that government would be responsive to the people, and changes, if any, could be achieved 
peacefully. Hughes CJ said this was the essence of constitutional government. It is 
considered to be a reasonable interpretation of this narrative that Deane and Toohey JJ 
would have supported an implied freedom of association, at least for political purposes. 
34
 (2004) 220 CLR 181. 
35
 Ibid 234; Heydon J agreed (306). 
36
 Ibid 225. 
37
 Ibid 277; Gleeson CJ did not discuss the issue; Callinan J implicitly rejected the concept 
(297). 
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In a different line of cases, what I will call the ‘anti-association 
legislation’ line of cases,38 similar sentiments are evident. For instance, in 
South Australia v Totani,39 French CJ alludes to the fact that freedom of 
association has been suggested by other members of the High Court as an 
incident of the implied freedom of political communication,40 and Hayne 
J refers to Act there as restricting a person’s freedom of association.41 In 
Wainohu v State of New South Wales,42 French CJ and Kiefel referred to 
the ‘implied freedom of political communication and freedom of 
association’,43 while Gummow Hayne Crennan and Bell JJ simply 
repeated the comment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Mulholland that the 
suggested freedom of association could only exist as a corollary to the 
implied freedom of political communication, and the same test of 
infringement and validity would apply.44  
Discussion of freedom of association has also occurred in the context of 
terrorism laws which impact on association rights by criminalising 
membership of a terrorist organisation45 and association with members of 
                                                           
38
 Broadly, these cases are occasions where the Parliament has sought to criminalise the act 
of associating with others, for instance, being a member of an outlaw motorcycle club, or a 
member of a banned political party. The classic case where the High Court considered 
attempts to ban political organisations was of course Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, though the case was expressly decided on the basis that 
the law was not supported by s 51(6), rather than on any implication of freedom of 
association, which was not recognised until 41 years later. There is interesting conjecture 
regarding whether, if faced with similar legislation today, the Court would strike it down as 
an infringement of the implied freedom of political association: George Winterton, ‘The 
Communist Party Case’ in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional 
Landmarks (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 108, 133-134; Edward Santow and 
George Williams, ‘Terrorism Threat Assessments: Problems of Constitutional Law and 
Government Accountability’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 33; Andrew Lynch, Nicola 
McGarrity and George Williams, ‘Lessons From the History of the Proscription of 
Terrorist and Other Organisations by the Australian Parliament’ (2009) 13 Legal History 
25, 53: ‘criminalisation of membership per se is problematic both in principle and 
practice’.  
39
 (2010) 242 CLR 1. 
40
 Ibid 29, 54. 
41
 Ibid 84. 
42
 (2011) 243 CLR 181. 
43
 Ibid 220. 
44
 Heydon J agreed with this proposition: ibid 251. This suggestion, that an individual’s 
right to associate is a corollary of, and limited in the same way as, the implied freedom to 
communicate about government matters is in some ways similar to the second limb of the 
freedom of association right discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Roberts, 
Acting Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights et al v United States 
Jaycees 468 US 609 (1984). Others argue that the freedom of association should be seen as 
an individual right on its own, not derivative of the right to free speech: David Cole, 
‘Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists and the Right of Association’ 
(1999) Supreme Court Review 203, 206.  
45
 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 102.3 criminalises intentionally being a member of a 
terrorist organisation, knowing that it is such an organisation. 
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a terrorist organisation,46 as well as providing for control orders47 and 
preventive detention orders.48 Concerns in that context have been raised 
mostly from academics,49 rather than judges.50 Further, most of those 
provisions contain tight restrictions on the circumstances in which they 
are applicable, minimising their potential incursion on the implied 
freedom of association and making it more likely that the Court would be 
likely to find them directed to a legitimate objective and in a manner 
compatible with representative and responsible government.51  
                                                           
46
 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 102.8 criminalises the act of an individual, on at least two 
occasions, intentionally associating with another who is a member of or promotes or directs 
the activities of a terrorism organisation, knowing that it is such an organisation, and 
intending the support to assist the organisation. 
47
 Conditions on such orders can include specific restrictions on an individual associating 
with others (s 104.5(3)(e)), if this would substantially assist in the prevention of a terrorist 
act. 
48
 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 105.4 (these would limit a person’s ability to associate with 
others for a limited period). 
49
 See, eg, Andrew Lynch, Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, ‘The Proscription of 
Terrorist Organisations in Australia’ (2009) 37 Federal Law Review 1, 17: ‘the breadth of 
the definition of a terrorist organisation has the potential to infringe the freedoms of 
expression and association under international law and the Commonwealth Constitution’; 
Joo Cheong-Tham, ‘Possible Constitutional Objections to the Powers to Ban ‘Terrorist’ 
Organisations’ (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 482, David Cole, 
‘The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism’ (2003) 38 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 1; Aidan Ricketts ‘Freedom of Association or 
Guilt by Association: Australia’s New Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Retreat of Political 
Liberty’ (2002) Southern Cross University Law Review 133. 
50
 In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 for instance, where the High Court 
considered the validity of the control order provisions in the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) 
(Division 104), only Kirby J (dissenting) expressly considered their impact on the right to 
associate: ‘clearly, the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions that might be imposed on 
an order made under s 104.4 of the Code will potentially infringe any, or all, of these 
rights’ (referring to, amongst other rights, freedom of association) (440). 
51
 For instance, the s 102.8 offence is confined to associations with members of a terrorist 
organisation where that association is intended to support or assist the organisation. Section 
104 control orders are limited to occasions where the court is satisfied the order would 
substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act or where the person affected is reasonably 
believed to have provided or received training from a terrorist organisation. Preventive 
detention orders in s 105.4 are limited to occasions where the court is satisfied the person 
will engage in a terrorist act, has implements associated with a terrorist attack, is planning 
such acts, where their detention (for a limited period) would substantially assist in the 
prevention of a terrorist attack. These kinds of restrictions don’t appear in an equivalent 
way in the consorting provisions. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld 
provisions criminalising the act of knowingly providing material support to a foreign 
terrorist organisation against a First and Fifth Amendment challenge: Holder v 
Humanitarian Law Project (2010) 130 S.Ct 2705. However, the Court was careful to note 
that they were only deciding that it was constitutionally valid to prohibit the act of 
providing material support to a foreign terrorist organisation; they specifically left open 
whether there would be a different answer if the legislation had criminalised speech or 
advocacy (2730), and found the legislation had no freedom of association implications 
(2730-2731) (Roberts CJ, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito; Breyer Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor JJ dissenting). 
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So, whilst there is numerous dicta (as well as influential academic 
authority) to the effect that some kind of freedom of association is 
protected by the Australian Constitution, it is just that – dicta. It has never 
been necessary to decide a case on the precise question of the freedom of 
association; the cases were decided on other bases – in the first category 
of cases, whether there was a breach of the implied freedom of political 
communication according to the Lange test as modified in Coleman.52 
This line of cases dealt with legislation concerning communication that 
was ‘political’ in nature in the broad sense of that word, for example 
advertising during election periods, and protests about matters of public 
interest.53 The communication was made in public. They could be 
decided purely on the implied freedom of political communication.  
The other line of cases dealing with anti-association legislation, cases like 
Totani, Wainohu and Pompano,54 were not decided on the basis of 
possible infringement with the implied freedom of association, despite the 
fact that such laws clearly impacted such a freedom. Instead, on each 
occasion the court applied the Kable principle to these cases,55 and asked 
whether a court was being conscripted in the implementation of an 
executive plan and/or being asked to act in a manner contrary to 
                                                           
52
 (2004) 220 CLR 1. See above n 8. 
53
 Gaudron J suggested that the freedom of association may not be restricted to association 
for political purposes: ‘not every restriction on communication is a restriction on the 
communication of political ideas and information. On the other hand, any abridgement of 
the right to move in society and to associate with one’s fellow citizens necessarily restricts 
the opportunity to obtain and impart information and ideas with respect to political matters’ 
(Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 126-127). 
54
 Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 295 ALR 
638. 
55
 Essentially, the Kable principle is that a court established under the Australian 
Constitution cannot be given powers of such a nature that would undermine its 
independence, or create a perception that its independence was undermined. In other 
words, the court could not be asked to exercise power that was non-judicial in nature, or 
otherwise act in a way that would serve to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. 
This line of cases commenced with Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 
189 CLR 51, where essentially legislation allowed a court to make an order that a 
particular offender (which the Act named) be retained in custody after the end of his 
allocated sentence, if the court was satisfied that it was more likely than not that the named 
individual would, if released, re-offend. The legislation directed that in making its decision, 
the court should give most emphasis to requirements of public safety, and normal rules of 
evidence did not apply. A majority of the High Court of Australia declared the legislation 
constitutionally invalid, impermissibly interfering with the independence of the court, 
conscripting it for the purpose of implementing an executive plan, and undermining public 
confidence in the judiciary. Since that case, the principle has been developed so as to strike 
down legislation requiring a court to make a control order against a member of a 
motorcycle club, once the Attorney-General had declared that club to be a proscribed 
organisation under state law. The court had no discretion not to make the order once the 
Attorney had made the declaration. A majority of the High Court declared the legislation to 
be unconstitutional, in breach of the Kable principle: State of South Australia v Totani 
(2010) 242 CLR 1. 
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traditional judicial process, such that the constitutionally mandated 
separation of powers, and public confidence in the independence of the 
judiciary, was being undermined.  
This has left the Australian law in a partially developed state. While it 
seems that the Court accepts an implied freedom of association, it has not 
(yet) formed the basis of any decision, the Court has chosen not to apply 
the principle in recent cases which potentially directly enlivened 
consideration of the principle, preferring instead to decide on other 
grounds. Further, while some judges believe that any implied freedom of 
association is limited to the ‘political’ context (however defined), at least 
Mason CJ and Gaudron J in ACTV alluded to the possibility that the 
freedom might eventually be considered to be broader than ‘political’ 
discussion, and, to similar effect, recently French CJ has indicated a very 
broad interpretation of the meaning of ‘political’ in this context.56  
An important question is whether an implied freedom of political 
association is needed, given the acceptance of the implied freedom of 
political communication. The author’s position is that an implied freedom 
of political association is needed. This is because the consorting laws 
considered in this article directly criminalise association. They do not 
criminalise communication. As such, they directly raise the question of 
the extent to which pure association rights are protected by the 
Constitution. Given these laws criminalise association; they are best 
countered with arguments concerning a possible implied freedom of 
political association, rather than the implied freedom of political 
communication. Having said this, it must be acknowledged that there is 
unlikely to be a major difference between the operation of the concepts of 
political communication and political association. The purpose of 
association is communication. It is anticipated that just like with the 
implied freedom of political communication, the two-step Lange 
approach would be taken. Paraphrasing the Lange test, the first question 
would be whether the law effectively burdened freedom of association 
with respect to government or political matters in terms, operation or 
effect. The second would be whether, if the law did so, it was reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to a legitimate end in a manner compatible with 
representative and responsible government.  
The argument that the consorting laws could be challenged on the basis 
that they infringe the implied freedom of political communication is 
readily accepted, and the author expects that in many, if not all, cases the 
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 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [49] (French CJ) suggested that the political 
arguably includes social and economic features of Australian society, because they were 
matters at least potentially within the purview of government; Monis, [67]; Adelaide, [67]: 
‘the class of communication protected by the implied freedom in practical terms is wide’, 
in the course of finding that religious speeches could fall within the protection of the 
freedom. 
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result would be the same, regardless of whether the implied freedom of 
political communication, or an implied freedom of political association, is 
considered. However, it would be intellectually more coherent and logical 
to consider them through the prism of an implied freedom of political 
association, given that they literally criminalise association. It is 
noteworthy that it is not only this author that sees value in protecting 
freedom of association quite separately from freedom of expression more 
generally. This is clear in human rights instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all of which 
expressly protect freedom of association in a separate article from 
freedom of expression.57 Those who drafted such instruments obviously 
believed that it was better to protect freedom of association directly and 
expressly, rather than indirectly and implicitly through the freedom of 
expression path. 
As well as being, in the author’s view, more intellectually coherent to 
consider a law criminalising association in the context of freedom of 
association, there is also a practical benefit to doing so, rather than 
through the implied freedom of political communication. This is because 
the High Court, in its implied political communication jurisprudence, has 
itself drawn a distinction between laws which directly interfere with 
freedom of political communication, and laws which indirectly do so. 
Laws of the former category are more difficult to justify. 
Consider a law that directly criminalises political association under the 
above principles. According to the High Court, this law only indirectly 
interferes with political communication. It does not do so in its direct 
terms, but may have this consequential effect. As such, it is easier for the 
government to justify under existing principles, according to the Court. 
Yet, it is submitted that a law directly criminalising political association 
is a law that directly attacks the heart of representative and responsible 
government for which the Constitution provides, so should instead be 
very difficult to justify, not easier to justify as the current jurisprudence 
would conclude. In the author’s view, this demonstrates the practical 
utility of recognising an implied freedom of political association, apart 
from (but of course closely linked with) the implied freedom of political 
communication. 
In a situation where the Australian case law is underdeveloped, it is 
considered instructive to consider other perspectives, to provide possible 
                                                           
57
 European Convention on Human Rights – freedom of expression is protected in art 
10(1), freedom of association in art 11, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights – freedom of expression is protected in art 19(2), freedom of association in art 21, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – freedom of expression in art 19, freedom 
of association in art 20. 
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direction for development of the freedom. The article will now consider 
the extent to which theoretical and international perspectives can assist in 
the articulation of the suggested freedom of association, and its 
application to the consorting laws. 
III FURTHER DIMENSIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
A Philosophical Underpinnings of the Freedom 
While freedom of association remains an underdeveloped area of 
Australian law, there is strong theoretical support for the existence of 
such a right. Leading writer on democracy Alexis De Tocqueville viewed 
freedom of association as one of the fundamental rights: 
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, 
is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures, and 
of acting in common with them. The right of association therefore appears 
to me almost an inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. 
No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of society 
...
58
 amongst democratic nations ... all the citizens are independent and 
feeble; they can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can 
oblige his fellow-men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, 
become powerless, if they do not learn voluntarily to help each other. If 
men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to 
associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great 
jeopardy ...59 feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and 
the human mind is developed, only by the reciprocal influence of men 
upon each other.60 
The centrality of association with others in terms of an individual’s self-
development and identity has been noted.61 As Mill puts it: 
Why is it, then, there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of 
rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this 
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 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Richard Heffner translated and edited, 
1956) 98; ‘the very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of 
its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for 
redress of grievances’ (United States v Cruikshank et al 92 US 542, 552 (1876)). 
59
 Ibid 199. 
60
 Ibid 200. See also T Emerson, ‘Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression’ 
(1964) 74 Yale Law Journal 1, 1: ‘the individual, in order to realise his own capacities or to 
stand up to the institutionalized forces that surround him, has found it imperative to join 
with others of like mind in pursuit of common objectives’; ‘as social beings, our freedom 
to act with others is a primary condition of community life, human progress and civilised 
society’ (Dickson CJ (dissenting) in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act 
(Alta)[1987] 1 S.C.R 313, [86]. 
61
 George Kateb, ‘The Value of Association’ in Amy Gutmann ed, Freedom of Association 
(1998) 48; Isaiah Berlin ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) 131; 
Liat Levanon, ‘Criminal Prohibitions on Membership in Terrorist Organisations’ (2012) 15 
New Criminal Law Review 224, 268. 
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preponderance ... it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of 
everything respectable in a man either as an intellectual or as a moral 
being; namely that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his 
mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There 
must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong 
opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and 
arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. 
Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring 
out their meaning ... the only way in which a human being can make some 
approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be 
said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all 
modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise 
man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this.62 
Further, if we accept the ‘social contract’ doctrine that members of a 
society unite together in order to better protect their rights and interests, 
delegating some right and powers to a government, it is hard to square 
this with laws criminalising association not proven to have criminal 
overtones. As Rousseau himself noted, government’s powers over 
subjects do not go beyond the boundaries of ‘public utility’; he quoted 
d’Argenson that ‘everyone is perfectly free to do what does not injure 
others’. Rousseau calls that the ‘invariable boundary’.63 It is hard to see 
that associating with other people, without more, injures others.  
These learned thinkers reflect the fundamental importance to a democracy 
and to a society generally, of the ability of individuals to associate with 
others. As individuals whose ideas underpin western democratic 
principles, their ideas about the importance of the freedom of association 
must be borne in mind. These theoretical perspectives tend to reiterate in 
the author’s mind that no narrow or pedantic view should be taken of 
such a fundamental freedom. When we weigh up the validity of laws 
affecting that freedom, we must remember the weight and importance that 
is rightly given to the ability of individuals to congregate and 
communicate as they see fit. International human rights instruments 
reflect principles of freedom of association rights.64 It is not considered 
radical to suggest that a democratic nation such as Australia should 
protect a fundamental freedom such as the right to association. It would 
be artificial to protect freedom of political communication, but not 
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 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative 
Government (Everyman, 1972) 88. See also Isaiah Berlin who develops the idea of 
affirmative self-development: ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) 
131. 
63
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin Books, 1968)165. 
64
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (arts 21 and 22), European 
Convention on Human Rights (art 11(1)), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(art 20), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (art 2(f)), New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 s 17. 
Freedom of Association and the Crime of Consorting   163 
 
freedom of political association. It is necessary to associate to 
communicate. 
Further, the above authors make no distinction between speech or 
association that is ‘political’, and speech or association that is not. 
Arguably, nor should the Australian courts, particularly given the 
difficulty of discerning what counts as ‘political’ in this context and what 
does not, and the practical question, that communication often involves a 
mixture of what might be called ‘political’ communication and what 
might be called non-political communication, making practical 
enforcement of laws that target the non-political speech aspect, but which 
defer to the constitutional freedom in the political speech aspect, very 
problematic. This issue will be discussed in more detail later. 
B United States Experience  
It is considered instructive to consider the rich jurisprudence from the 
United States on the right to free speech. That country is the leading 
democracy in the world, and links between freedom of association and 
democracy have just been noted. If the High Court were to recognise an 
implied freedom of association, it might be helpful, in considering the 
appropriate balance between freedom of speech and the need for 
community safety from potentially harmful associations, to consider that 
country’s experience. As always, textual differences must be noted – the 
American right is an express one enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the 
Australian freedom (if a freedom of association were to be recognised by 
the Australian High Court) would be is implied from our Constitution. 
The American right is a positive right, founding actions for breach of it, 
whereas the Australian freedom would be a negative freedom, in the 
sense of a protection from interference, rather than a positive right. On 
the other hand, in the United States, as in Australia, the right (freedom) 
has not been considered to be absolute. Limitations on the right/freedom 
may be constitutionally justifiable, if narrowly drawn, and a balancing of 
competing interests is implicit. The extent of the interference with the 
right, questions of proportionality, the availability of means less invasive 
to achieve the legitimate end, and the strength of the government 
justification for the intrusion are all important. It is useful to see how this 
balancing has occurred in other democracies. 
There should not be an objection to considering First Amendment case 
law in respect of the implied freedom of political communication and 
association. This point is necessary in light of the claim by three High 
Court judges in Monis v The Queen that ‘there is little to be gained (in 
considering the Australian implied freedom) by recourse to jurisprudence 
concerning the First Amendment’.65 It can fairly be said that High Court 
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 Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [326] (Crennan Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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judges have differed on the relevance of American constitutional 
principles to interpretation of the Australian Constitution. The relevance 
of the American principles to Australia has been recognised at the macro 
level,66 in the sense of their relevance to our Constitution generally, as 
well as at the micro level on the precise issue of the interpretation of the 
implied freedom of political communication, where there are numerous 
references to, and use of, American First Amendment case law and 
principles in the course of developing Australian jurisprudence in this 
area.
67
 As a result, and despite some clear reservations about the use of 
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 Sir Owen Dixon noted that the Australian founding fathers ‘followed with remarkable 
fidelity the model of the American instrument of government’ and referred to differences 
between the Australian and American models as being ‘intangible’: Jesting Pilate (1965) 
102, 104. Examples include the fundamental reasonably appropriate and adapted test of the 
constitutionality of a law (McCullough v Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316, 321 (Marshall 
CJ), applied in cases like Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; in the context of 
interpreting s 80 of the Australian Constitution (‘one would expect that it was the intention 
of the framers of our Constitution to carry over into s 80 any settled interpretation of the 
words of that central command in the United States provision’ (Cheatle v The Queen 
(1993) 177 CLR 541, 556); s 92 (Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 
318); s51(31) (Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255, 282: ‘the source of s 51(31) is to be 
found in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States’ (Dixon J); 
Winterton, Lee, Glass and Thomson, Australian Constitutional Law: Commentary and 
Materials (Thompson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2007) 172 and Leslie Zines, The High Court and the 
Constitution (Federation Press, 4th ed, 1997), 55 - refer to s 51(1) as having been ‘clearly 
taken’ from the United States Constitution. 
67
 For those new to this area, examples from the Australian free speech cases include 
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 140 and 143 
(Mason CJ), 231, 235, 239 (McHugh J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 
CLR 1, 32 (Mason CJ), 79 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Theophanous v Herald and Weekly 
Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 130 (referring to the fact that the United States provision 
is broader, applying to speech generally not just political speech, ‘but that circumstance is 
not a reason for concluding that the United States and European approaches are irrelevant 
and inappropriate to our situation’ (Mason CJ Toohey and Gaudron JJ), and 130-136, 
Deane J (177, 182); Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594 (Brennan CJ), 623 (McHugh 
J), 638-642 (Kirby J) (‘in determining the scope of the constitutionally protected freedom 
of communication in Australia, it seems reasonable to take into consideration at least some 
of the matters mentioned in the United States decisions (641-642), and ‘the influence of 
United States jurisprudence upon (Mason CJ’s observations in Australian Capital 
Television, the fundamental implied freedom decision of the High Court) was obvious and 
was acknowledged’ (645); Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 75 (Gummow and Hayne 
JJ) (‘support for the construction we have given can be had from considering what had 
been said in the Supreme Court of the United States about the application of the First 
Amendment’), 99 (Kirby J, who earlier had expressed support for the use of international 
law doctrines in interpreting human rights generally (92-94)); Attorney-General (SA) v 
Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197, [151] (Heydon J); Monis v The 
Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [27]-[28] (French CJ); Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 
1, 21 where Heydon J referred to the ‘distinct but related field of First Amendment 
litigation’; and leading academic in this field Adrienne Stone: ‘the influence of American 
constitutional jurisprudence and specifically First Amendment law in the High Court of 
Australia has never been more significant than in the most adventurous of its (the High 
Court’s) decisions on the freedom of political communication’: ‘Freedom of Political 
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the American material by some of the judges recently in Monis,68 it is not 
considered radical or controversial to consider First Amendment case law 
in determining the parameters of the implied freedom of political 
communication in Australia. 
The United States court has recognised political communication as one of 
the most important categories of speech warranting First Amendment 
protection, and specifically connected freedom of speech with,  
a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety 
of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends ...69 
The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an 
indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.70 
A range of different types of laws with freedom of association 
implications has been considered by the United States Supreme Court.71 
On the occasions where such laws have been invalidated, sometimes this 
occurs because the legislation is seen to fail the void-for-vagueness test or 
the overbreadth test; sometimes the decision is explicitly based on the 
interference with freedom of association rights protected by the 
Constitution. 
Perhaps the factual scenario closest to association freedoms was 
considered in City of Chicago v Morales et al.72 There the Court 
considered laws giving police power to order a group loitering in a public 
place to disperse, if the officer reasonably believed the group were gang 
members.. Failure to disperse as ordered was a breach of the ordinance, 
punishable by a fine, jail time of up to six months, and/or community 
service. A majority of the court73 declared the provisions to be 
unconstitutional on the ‘void for vagueness’ principle. The power could 
be applied in an arbitrary way,74 citizens did not have proper notice of 
                                                                                                                             
Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 
219, 220.  
68
 It might be suggested here that the current High Court is less likely to adopt United 
States case law in this field than previous High Courts were, and our civil protection may 
be the poorer for it. 
69
 Roberts v United States Jaycees 468 US 609, 622 (1984). 
70
 Ibid 618, 
71
 A good summary of the issues is provided in Joel Berg ‘The Troubled Constitutionality 
of Antigang Loitering Laws’ (1994) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 461, in Jocelyn Santo, 
‘Down on the Corner: An Analysis of Gang-Related Anti-Loitering Laws’ (2001) 22 
Cardozo Law Review 269. 
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 527 US 41(1999); Kim Strosnider, ‘Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v 
Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the 
Criminal Law’ (2002) 39 American Criminal Law Review 101. 
73
 Rehnquist CJ Scalia and Thomas JJ dissenting. 
74
 527 US 41(1999), 58 (Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg JJ), 64-65 (O’Connor and Breyer 
JJ), 71 (Kennedy J). 
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what was forbidden and what was permitted,75 and the law did not 
distinguish between innocent and sinister associations.76 
The United States Supreme Court has struck down provisions banning or 
restricting members of particular organisations from employment in 
particular fields, particularly where there was no distinction drawn 
between active and passive members of the organisation, and no 
requirement that the person know of the association’s aims or agree with 
them. An Act could be unconstitutionally overbroad if it ‘literally 
establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that 
an individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government in 
proscribing it’.77 The legislation in Robel was invalid there ‘precisely 
because the statute sweeps indiscriminately across all types of association 
with communist-type groups, without regard to the quality and degree of 
membership’.78 
In contrast, since freedom of speech and freedom of association rights are 
not absolute, narrowly drawn provisions justifiably interfering with such 
a right may be valid.79 Specifically, there must be an act of individual 
culpability other than mere membership of the organisation, for example 
intent to commit violence or otherwise illegal acts: 
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of 
punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to 
the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal 
activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be 
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 Ibid 60 (Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg JJ). 
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 Ibid; Ibid 66 (O’Connor and Breyer JJ). 
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 United States v Robel 389 US 258, 265 (1967) (Warren CJ, with whom Black Douglas 
Stewart and Fortas JJ agreed; Harlan and White JJ dissenting, Brennan J concurred, 
Marshall J did not render a decision in the case). Similar findings were made in Elfbrandt v 
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Communist Party struck out in the absence of evidence the individual member intended to 
pursue aim of violently overthrowing the government), and Keyishan v Board of Regents of 
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certify they had never been a member of the Communist Party or if they had, they had 
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to a campus organisation by a University (held to violate First Amendment association 
rights (Healy v James 408 US 169 (1972) and used to overturn provisions criminalising 
participation in a Communist Party meeting (De Jonge v Oregon 299 US 353 (1937)). 
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 Ibid 262. 
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 For instance, a law interpreted to apply only to those individuals who were members of 
an organisation with aims to overthrow the government (such an organisation being illegal) 
and who were knowing and active supporters of the organisation’s aims was held valid 
against First Amendment challenge: Scales v United States 367 US 203 (1961); criminal 
anarchy provisions were validated against a First Amendment challenge (Gitlow v People 
of New York 268 US 652 (1925)). 
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sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to 
withstand (constitutional) attack. Membership, without more, in an 
organisation engaged in illegal advocacy ... has not .. been recognised by 
this Court to be such a relationship.80 
As Cole notes: 
Due process ... forbids the imposition of guilt by association no matter 
how clear the notice and no matter how fair the hearing ... guilt must be 
personal in order to be consistent with due process. To punish A for the 
acts of B, without showing any connection between A and the illegal acts 
of B other than A’s general connection to B, is fundamentally unfair. It is 
to punish a moral innocent. The specific intent requirement that the Court 
read into the (Act considered in Scales) and which it has subsequently 
held must be satisfied whenever the government seeks to penalize an 
individual for the acts of his associates, responds to the substantive due 
process problem by tying the imposition of guilt to an individually 
culpable act.81 
In another line of cases with some relevance to the current discussion, the 
United States Supreme Court has stated that criminal penalties may only 
be imposed where the defendant has committed some actus reus.82 This 
doctrine has been subsequently used to strike out ordinances, for instance, 
making it a crime for known drunks, drug addicts, prostitutes, pimps and 
convicted felons to congregate together in public or to loiter in places 
serving alcohol. The federal district court struck out the ordinance on the 
basis of a lack of actus reus; congregating and loitering did not qualify.83 
The Supreme Court has expressly noted that the associations protected by 
the First Amendment are not limited to political parties or those with 
expressly political motivations: 
We have protected forms of association that are not political in the 
customary sense but pertain to the social, legal and economic benefit of 
the members.84 
The Court has frowned on requirements that advocacy-based 
organisations be registered in a specific region prior to conducting their 
affairs. For instance, in National Association for the Advancement of 
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 Scales v United States 367 US 203, 224-225 (1961). 
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 David Cole, ‘Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists and the Right of 
Association’ (1999) Supreme Court Review 203, 217. 
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 Robinson v California 370 US 660, reh’g denied 371 US 905 (1962); Powell v Texas 392 
US 514, 533 (1968). 
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 Farber v Rochford 407 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D Ill. 1975). An anti-loitering statute was 
struck out for similar reasons, as well as vagueness, in Papachristou v City of Jacksonville 
405 US 156 (1972). 
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 Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479, 483 (1965); NAACP v Button 371 US 415 (1962); 
Schware v Board of Examiners 353 US 232 (1957); William Douglas, ‘The Right of 
Association’ (1963) 63 Columbia Law Review 1361. 
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Colored People v Alabama ex rel Patterson,85 Attorney-General the 
NAACP opened an office in Alabama without complying with local 
registration requirements. The State complained that the NAACP’s 
activities were causing irreparable damage to the State and sought to 
enjoin their continued activities. The Court invalidated the state 
requirement on the basis there was inadequate justification for the 
infringement of the appellants’ right to associate: 
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association ... It is 
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by ... 
freedom of speech ... Of course it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought 
to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or 
cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing 
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.86 
Subsequently, the Court articulated87 two distinct aspects of the freedom 
of association for which the Constitution provides – (a) choices to enter 
into and maintain intimate human relationships, and (b) a right to 
associate for the purposes of First Amendment activity, including speech, 
assembly, petition for the address of grievances, religion etc. In relation 
to (b), the organisation need not be formed solely or mainly to engage in 
‘expressive activity’ in order for that limb to be enlivened.88 
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 Roberts, Acting Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights et al v United 
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 The Supreme Court applied it in Boy Scouts of America and Monmouth Council et al v 
James Dale 530 US 640 (2000) to allow the Boy Scouts to exclude an openly homosexual 
scoutmaster; a majority of the Court found that to force the Boy Scouts to keep Dale as a 
scoutmaster would unacceptably infringe their right to expressive association. 
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C Europe 
Freedom of association and peaceful assembly is protected by art 11 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights,89 and freedom of expression, 
including the right to receive and impart information from/to others, 
protected by art 10.90 Notably again, the rights are not absolute, and 
legislative incursion on such rights may be valid, where they are narrowly 
drawn or ‘necessary in a democratic91 society’. Again, one sees the 
balancing of competing interests at work in the jurisprudence of this 
jurisdiction; again, it is worth considering this jurisprudence, in 
establishing the proper balance in Australia, were the High Court to 
acknowledge the existence of an implied freedom of association.  
Some of the contexts in which art 11 have been enlivened have included 
dealing with protesters. It has been found to be a breach of art 11, for 
instance, for police to arrest would-be protesters who police fear will 
resort to violence. The arrest response was held to be a disproportionate 
one to the achievement of the legitimate end of peace, and less drastic 
steps than that in fact taken were available.92 Criminalisation of 
membership of banned organisations has sometimes survived an art 11 
challenge.93 
A key contentious issue has been whether the freedom of association 
contemplated by art 11 is confined to associations that are political in 
nature, or is to be interpreted more broadly. The Article itself does not 
clarify this, merely mentioning membership of a trade union as one 
example of the right. This example might suggest that the right is not 
intended to be limited to political associations, since trade unions are not 
                                                           
89
 This is subject to limits prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of 
morals or for the rights and freedoms of others; see also art 21 and 22 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
90
 This is subject to similar limits as those referred to in the previous footnote; see also art 
19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
91
 This is considered particularly important in the current context; as will be recalled some 
members of the High Court in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 CLR 106, 137 (Mason CJ) and 210 (Gaudron J) related the implied freedom of 
political communication to ‘representative democracy’. 
92
 R v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55; see also Schwabe and M.G v 
Germany [2011] ECHR 1986 and Galstyan v Armenia [2007] ECHR 936. 
93
 Aydin v Germany [2011] ECHR 141; in contrast, a temporary ban on the activities of an 
organisation was held to be inconsistent with Art 11 in Christian Democrat People’s Party 
v Moldova [2006] ECHR 132; a refusal to register a political party was similarly held in 
Tsonev v Bulgaria [2006] ECHR 423, dissolution of a minority party (based on an 
allegation it was involved in terrorist activity) invalidated due to lack of evidence of that 
allegation (Hadep v Turkey [2010] ECHR 2027); refusal to register a religious organisation 
was similarly held invalid in Kimlya v Russia [2009] ECHR 1424. 
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necessarily political actors. There was a suggestion in an earlier case that 
the right not be interpreted to include merely social gatherings.94 
However a broader view has become evident. Baroness Hale thought in R 
v Her Majesty’s Attorney General that the right of association could be 
applied to fox hunters, clearly not a political association95, and on the 
appeal against that House of Lords decision, the European Court favoured 
a broader view: 
It would, in the Court’s view, be an unacceptably narrow interpretation of 
(art 11) to confine it only to that kind of assembly (referring to peaceful 
demonstration and participation in the democratic process), just as it 
would be too narrow an interpretation of art 10 to restrict it to expressions 
of opinion of a political character ... the Court is therefore prepared to 
assume that art 11 may extend to the protection of an assembly of an 
essentially social character.96 
In summary, the jurisprudence from the United States and Europe 
reiterates the fundamental nature of the freedom of association, connect it 
closely with freedom of communication, cast doubt on any supposed 
coherent distinction between communication/association that is political 
and that which is not, and acknowledge the possible acceptability of 
limits on freedom of communication/association, but only where a clear 
distinction appears between innocent associations and those of a sinister 
nature, to avoid ‘guilt by association’. I turn now to consider an example 
of laws which interfere substantially with the freedom of association, 
consorting laws. The recently reworked New South Wales provisions are 
the prime example. 
IV OUTLINE OF CURRENT CONSORTING PROVISIONS 
The current New South Wales version of the offence is contained in the 
Crimes Amendment (Consorting and Organised Crime) Act 2012 (NSW), 
                                                           
94
 Anderson v United Kingdom [1997] ECHR 150; there the court acknowledged that the 
right applied to private and publicly held meetings, but considered whether the applicants 
in that case had any history of organised assembly or association, as apparently opposed to 
‘purely social purposes’; see also R v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General and Another [2007] 
UKHL 52, [58] (Lord Hope). 
95
 [2007] UKHL 52, [118]. 
96
 Friend v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 2068, [50] (all members of the Court). 
Consistent with the European position, the Supreme Court in Canada has agreed that 
freedom of association is not limited to political associations, and extends to associations 
of a religious, social or economic nature: Le Dain, Beetz and La Forest JJ in Reference Re 
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta)[1987] 1 S.C.R 313, Le Dain, Beetz and La 
Forest JJ [142], Dickson CJ and Wilson J [85-86]: ‘I am unable to regard (freedom of 
association) as embodying purely political freedoms ...(its) purpose is .. to recognise the 
profoundly social nature of human endeavours and to protect the individual form state-
enforced isolation in the pursuit of his or her ends’. 
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which amended the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) by inserting a new Division 
7 in Part 3A of the Act. Consorting is defined to mean ‘consorting’ in 
person or any other means, including electronically.97 The offence 
provision is s 93X, stating that a person who habitually consorts with 
convicted offenders,98 and consorts with them after having been given an 
official warning99 in relation to each of those offenders, is guilty of an 
offence.100 Habitually consorting with convicted offenders is defined to 
mean that the person consorts with at least two convicted offenders 
(either at the same time or on separate occasions), and consorts with each 
on at least two occasions. A defence is available if the person can prove 
that they consorting in which they were involved related to seeing family 
members, or was for other legitimate reasons like business, education or 
training, to obtain health services, legal advice, or pursuant to a court 
order. However, such consorting must be ‘reasonable’ in order for the 
defence to apply.101 The maximum penalty for committing the offence is 
three years’ imprisonment, up to 150 penalty units, or both. 
Other jurisdictions have criminal provisions relating to consorting. This 
includes Victoria, where the offence extends to associating with someone 
who is merely suspected, not convicted, of committing a particular kind 
of offence.102 The Western Australia provisions relate to declared 
(convicted) drug traffickers consorting with other declared drug 
                                                           
97
 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 93W.  
98
 A convicted offender is someone who has been convicted of an indictable offence: s 
93W. 
99
 This warning can be given verbally or in writing by a police officer, and is to the effect 
that the person with whom the person warned is consorting is a convicted offender, and 
that consorting with a convicted person is an offence (s 93X(3)). The lack of criteria upon 
which the police officer decides whether or not to issue the warning triggers consideration 
of the Communist Party case (Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth) (1951) 83 
CLR 1 where the Court found legislation invalid partly due to the lack of criteria for the 
exercise of discretion provided to a member of the executive in declaring an organisation 
(association) to be prejudicial to the war effort. However, this was a federal law and the 
law was declared invalid because it was not supported by a head of power, namely the 
defence power. As a result, care must be taken not to read the case as a grand assertion of 
freedom of association rights, as noted by esteemed constitutional lawyer George 
Winterton in ‘The Significance of the Communist Party Case’ (1992) 18(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 630, 657; Winterton quotes Fullagar J in the case to the effect that 
the law impugned in the Communist Party case would have been valid if passed by a state 
(262, Communist Party case). 
100
 I will use the phrase ‘warned off’ in the remainder of this article to refer to this 
requirement. 
101
 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 93Y. 
102
 Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 49F where the other with whom the person is 
consorting has been found guilty of, or is reasonably suspected of having committed, an 
organised crime offence. The South Australian provision is very similar, including 
consorting with a person merely suspected of criminal activity, and confining the 
application of the law to those convicted of or suspected of ‘serious and organised’ crime 
(s 13 Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA). 
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traffickers after being warned not to do so.103 The Tasmanian provisions 
criminalise consorting with ‘reputed thieves’ unless the person can show 
they had lawful means of support and had good reasons for consorting 
with the others.104 The Northern Territory provisions criminalise 
habitually consorting with ‘reputed criminals’.105 In October 2013 the 
Queensland Government moved against so-called ‘criminal 
organisations’, declaring twenty-six motorcycle clubs to be such 
organisations. New s 60A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) now makes it 
an offence for a participant106 in a criminal organisation being knowingly 
present in a public place with two or more other participants. An offence 
against this section is punishable by a minimum of six months’ jail (to be 
wholly served in a correctional facility), and a maximum of three years’ 
jail.107 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of these various regimes is that they 
do not require any evidence that the purpose of the ‘consorting’ have any 
sinister overtones. With the exception of the Western Australian 
provision, the only ‘wrong’ that the person guilty of this offence need 
have committed is to ‘consort’ with a person or persons who have a 
criminal record or in some cases someone suspected of criminal 
behaviour, in some cases after having been ‘warned off’ by police, in 
some cases not, or in the case of the new Queensland laws, associate with 
other members of a banned organisation. The ‘consorting’ may be for 
entirely benign purposes;108 despite the existence of defences in some of 
the Acts, this may not preclude the conduct being considered criminal. 
The idea of criminalising this type of behaviour is not new, having links 
                                                           
103
 Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA) s 557J. 
104
 Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 6. 
105
 Summary Offences Act (NT) s 56(1)  
106
 A participant is someone who by words or conduct asserts, declares or advertises their 
membership of an association, seeks to be a member, attends more than one meeting of 
those who participate in the affairs of the association, or someone who takes part in the 
affairs of the organisation in another way. Lawyers acting in a professional capacity are not 
considered participants. 
107
 It is a defence to show that the criminal organisation is not one whose participants have 
as their purpose, or one of their purposes, engaging in or conspiring to engage in criminal 
activity. 
108
 The New South Wales provisions provided a ‘defence’ for some kinds of benign 
associations, including family associations, employment or training related associations 
etc, but not other kinds of benign associations, for instance an association between friends, 
an association among neighbours, members of a social or community group etc (s 93Y); 
Victoria recognises a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence (s 49F(2)), Western Australia provides 
for a defence if the accused would otherwise commit the offence with respect to 
associating with their partner, defacto child or lineal relative (s 557J(3); Tasmania provides 
a ‘good reasons’ defence (s 6(2)), and South Australia requires the consorting occur 
‘without reasonable excuse’ in order for the offence to be committee (s 13). 
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with old provisions criminalising vagrancy and loitering.109 The fact that 
such laws may be selectively applied by police for other purposes has 
been noted by other scholars.110  
V APPLICATION OF THE IMPLIED FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
TO CONSORTING LAWS 
Assuming that the High Court of Australia would today find an implied 
freedom of association in the Constitution, at least for political purposes, 
how would such a freedom apply to consorting laws? I will use the New 
South Wales laws as the prime example, but many of the comments are 
applicable to consorting laws generally. I will draw attention to 
differences in the various Acts in the following discussion, where 
appropriate. A key distinction is that some jurisdictions recognise 
something of a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence to the application of these 
laws,111 whilst others do not.112 This application will serve to highlight 
possible deficiencies of the law regarding political association as it 
currently stands, allowing me to suggest future development of the 
jurisprudence in this area.   
A None of the consorting provisions contain an exception 
relating to association for purely political purposes 
Of all of the current consorting provisions discussed above, it is 
noteworthy that none of them contain an express defence pertaining to the 
discussion of political matters. Yet, conflict between the objectives of the 
Act and the freedom of political association or communication can be 
readily conjured. Assume that I am a member of a political party, and 
wish to attend a branch meeting. As it happens, two other members of the 
branch have a criminal record. If, having been ‘warned off’ by the police 
in respect of consorting with those two individuals, I do so again by 
attending another party branch meeting together with those individuals, I 
would literally be in breach of the consorting laws. None of the legislated 
New South Wales defences would apply.113 
                                                           
109
 For instance, Stephen notes a 1744 British vagrancy statute referring to ‘idle and 
disorderly persons’, ‘rogues and vagabonds’ and ‘incorrigible rogues’ (A History of the 
Criminal Law of England (1882) 273; Mark Malone, ‘Homelessness in a Modern Urban 
Setting’ (1982) 10 Fordham Urban Law Journal 749. 
110
 Alex Steel, ‘Consorting in New South Wales: Substantive Offence or Police Power?’ 
(2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 567; see also Andrew McLeod, ‘On 
the Origins of Consorting Laws’ (2013) 37(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1. 
111
 Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia. 
112
 New South Wales, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory. (Western Australia is 
included within this group because its defence is limited to associations amongst family 
members). 
113
 With respect to the Victorian, Tasmanian and South Australian provisions, it is possible 
to argue that this association would be for ‘good reason’, and within an exception to the 
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The consorting law applied in this context would, in the author’s view, 
fall foul of the first Lange limb – the purpose of the meeting is to discuss 
political issues, members associate for that purpose, and the law burdens 
the freedom to communicate (and associate) about political matters. The 
second limb is typically more contentious – whether the burden is 
reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner 
compatible with representative and responsible government. The author 
suggests it would be difficult to satisfy this test if the law effectively 
banned members of a political party from congregating to discuss 
political matters. It is submitted to be very likely that the law, at least as 
applied in this context, would be struck out, or read down.  
I would acknowledge here, for the purposes of argument that preventing 
criminal activity is a legitimate end. However, to ban associations that 
might happen to involve people with a past criminal record is not 
considered to be reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving this 
end. If the assumption behind such a law is that a person with a past 
criminal record is probably congregating for the purpose of committing 
further crime, such an assumption is contrary to our system of criminal 
justice. In reaching this conclusion, support is drawn from authorities in 
the United States and Europe to which reference was made earlier, 
authorities confirming that guilt by association alone is not consistent 
with First Amendment rights,114 and that arresting someone merely 
because you think they might commit crime in future is contrary to 
association rights.115  
Hence, at the very least, it is submitted these consorting laws need to be 
read down to accommodate the implied freedom of association in respect 
of a meeting of a political party. However, in many cases the situation is 
more complex. 
B Where an Association Involves a Mixture of Political and 
Social Ends 
The High Court in its dicta comments on freedom of association has often 
sought to limit the right so that it applies strictly to political associations. 
In the contexts in which the argument about the implied freedom has 
arisen, political associations have often been involved, so the issue of an 
association for a mixture of political/non-political purposes has not had to 
be squarely addressed. Some judges have insisted that the freedom of 
                                                                                                                             
offence. If these provisions were read in this manner, they would be less likely to be found 
constitutionally invalid. This would not be possible in New South Wales (as indicated), 
Western Australia or the Northern Territory. 
114
 United States v Robel 389 US 258 (1967); City of Chicago v Morales 527 US 41 (1999) 
115
 R v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55; see also Schwabe and M.G v 
Germany [2011] ECHR 1986 and Galstyan v Armenia [2007] ECHR 936. 
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association is a corollary to the implied freedom of political 
communication, and is similarly limited. Two judges in Australian 
Capital Television Pty Ltd hinted that, at least over time, the freedom 
might be broadened beyond the mere ‘political’.116 This issue was also 
canvassed by one of the judges in Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation 
of the City of Adelaide.117 The author submits that the distinction between 
purely political association, and non-political association, is sometimes 
not so easily drawn. It is submitted to be impractical in many cases to 
assume a strict division between the types of association.118 
For example, let us continue with the scenario where I attend meetings of 
a political party. Assume my argument above is accepted that the 
consorting provisions as applied to this meeting could infringe the 
implied freedom of political communication because the gathering is for 
political purposes. Of course, people often congregate for a range of 
purposes, and no doubt even at a meeting of a political party, talk will 
turn to matters that are not political. One member may ask another 
member how their family is, or talk might turn to sport.  
It is impractical to have a law that would operate in such a way that while 
the focus of the meeting was on political issues, that part of the meeting 
attracted the constitutional defence, but as soon as talk turned to non-
political matters, police could begin arresting participants for consorting 
(obviously, if they met the requirements, such as some of the participants 
having a criminal record, and an individual having been warned off 
associating with them, but disregarding such warning). How would this 
be enforced? Police would have to attend at or eavesdrop on the meeting. 
Is it sensible to suppose they would step in depending on the direction of 
each conversation? Similar problems would arise in policing the 
consorting laws in respect of the fabled over-the-fence conversations with 
neighbours, where my neighbour happens to have a criminal record, and 
police have given me the appropriate warning. Is the conversation 
protected while talk is confined to the recent Australian election, 
America’s economic recovery or the future of Europe, but not protected 
                                                           
116
 (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138: ‘indispensable to (politicians’) accountability and that 
responsibility (to the people) is freedom of communication, at least in relation to public 
affairs and political discussion’) (Mason CJ) (emphasis added); 212: ‘the notion of a free 
society governed in accordance with the principles of representative parliamentary 
democracy may entail freedom of movement, freedom of association, and perhaps, 
freedom of speech generally’ (Gaudron J) (ie speech, and perhaps association, not confined 
to that which was ‘political’. 
117
 (2013) 295 ALR 197, where Hayne J said that because the impugned provisions limited 
political and other communications, they effectively burdened freedom of communication 
about political matters: [133]. 
118
 A very broad view of what is ‘political’ here was taken by French CJ in Hogan v Hinch 
(2011) 243 CLR 506, where he claimed that it arguably included social and economic 
features of Australian society, because they were matters at least potentially within the 
purview of government: [49].  
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when it turns to the football or netball? The legal argument is that while 
the distinction between what is ‘political’ and what is ‘non-political’ has 
been relatively easy to make in the context of communication that has 
been on the public record, it is much more difficult to apply it in the 
context of association. For the author, this calls into question whether the 
Australian law in this area should evolve in a manner that relaxes the 
current requirement that the protected communication (association) have 
the required ‘political’ character.  
Support for the argument that the freedom of association cannot 
realistically be limited to purely ‘political’ associations exists at 
international level. The American cases have confirmed now that 
associations that might be social in nature are protected,119 as has the 
European Court of Human Rights in a recent decision.120 In the 
experience of both of these jurisdictions, rights were originally limited to 
associations that were political in nature. Eventually, the move was taken 
to broaden the right beyond that horizon. In part, this reflects the 
theoretical understanding of the value to society and to each person 
individually of having the ability to associate with others of their choice, 
for a range of reasons.  
Kirk has made a similar point: 
If the constitutional freedom were limited to protecting groups formed 
primarily for political purposes it would protect political parties but little 
else. The justifications for free associations ... would extend the freedom 
to groups beyond political parties. Therefore the better view is that a right 
to form or join any association with even potentially political aims should 
be recognised.121 
In the author’s view, it also reflects the impracticality of laws that depend 
for their enforcement on whether a conversation meets the definition of 
being ‘political’, or not. Some Australian judges have themselves alluded 
to difficulties in distinguishing between what is ‘political’ and what is 
not. Freedom of association, for political and non-political ends, is 
protected in the great democracy of the United States, and is seen as 
fundamental to those adherents to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, with departures being exceptional and necessary in a democratic 
society. We don’t, or should not have, a second-class democracy in 
                                                           
119
 Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965), Roberts v United States Jaycees 468 US 
609 (1984). 
120
 Friend v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 2068. 
121
 Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy’ (1995) 23 
Federal Law Review 37, 56. It is conceded that Kirk did not advocate that the distinction 
between ‘political’ and ‘non-political’ speech be abandoned altogether, rather that a broad 
definition be applied to the word ‘political’. 
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Australia, with limited rights based on distinctions that are both 
impractical and unreflective of the theoretical basis of the right. 
While no member of the High Court has yet accepted the argument about 
the impracticability of neatly separating communication or association 
that is ‘political’ and that which is not, the Chief Justice recently defined 
‘political’ communication in such a way that might lead, in time, to the 
abandonment of the distinction,122 and another judge said that at as long 
as the law could apply to political communication, the Lange principles 
could be applied to it, despite the fact the law could apply to non-political 
communication as well.123 These comments, and those made above, 
suggest that the implied freedom of association could be infringed by the 
consorting laws, because consorting may involve a mixture of political 
and social ends (Hayne J), because the consorting involves discussing 
‘social and economic features of Australian society’ (French CJ), or 
because it is not practically possible to police a strict distinction between 
political association and non-political association, and this has been 
recognised internationally (Griswold v Connecticut, Friend v United 
Kingdom, Kirk, current author). 
C The laws do not distinguish between innocent associations 
and sinister associations 
Some of the consorting laws don’t distinguish between associations that 
might be for entirely innocent purposes, and associations that might have 
sinister overtones. This statement is sensitive to the existence of defences 
in some of the jurisdictions studied, some of which provide for 
‘reasonable excuse’ defences.124 Concern with the lack of distinction 
between sinister associations and benign associations is again most 
pressing with respect to the New South Wales laws, which provides for 
very limited defences in s93Y such that many innocent associations 
would fall outside of the defences, the Northern Territory, where no 
exception is legislated, and in Western Australia, where the only defence 
relates to associations amongst family members.  
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 French CJ suggested recently in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [49] that the 
political arguably includes social and economic features of Australian society, because they 
were matters at least potentially within the purview of government.  
123
 Hayne J in City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197, [133]. 
124
 For example, s 49F(2) of the Victorian Act (defence of reasonable excuse), s 6(2) of the 
Tasmanian Act (good reasons defence), s 13 of the South Australian Act (the offence is 
defined so as to require the association occur ‘without reasonable excuse’), and a family 
member exception in Western Australia (s 557J(3)). There is no such defence in the 
Northern Territory. The defence legislated in New South Wales is more restrictive than 
‘reasonable excuse’ (s 93Y). If the defence in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia is 
read in such a way that a non-sinister reason for associating is sufficient to fall within the 
‘reasonable excuse’ defence, they are less likely to be deemed unconstitutional, in the 
author’s view. 
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It is accepted that the right to associate is not an absolute right, and some 
restrictions may be justified. For instance, there is no constitutionally 
difficulty with criminalising conspiracy, where a number of offenders 
meet to plan criminal activity. There is a clear public interest in 
criminalising such activity, despite it interfering with an individual’s right 
of association. Carefully drawn conspiracy offences would not infringe a 
constitutional right to association. However, these consorting provisions 
apply indiscriminately, regardless of the purpose of the association. There 
is American precedent to support the argument that criminalising 
association in the absence of evidence of sinister motives for the 
association is contrary to First Amendment rights.125 Related 
jurisprudence has found it unacceptable to criminalise a person’s status, 
rather than an act or omission.126 
Some analogy may be drawn with the situation considered in the recent 
Australian High Court decision of Roach v Electoral Commissioner,127 
involving legislation denying the right to vote to a range of individuals in 
custody. A majority of the High Court found the legislation to be invalid 
in its application to those in custody for a short time, such as the 
appellant.128 Central to this decision was consideration of what s 7 and s 
24 of the Constitution required in terms of a representative government. 
In the majority, Gleeson CJ stated that the franchise was critical to 
representative government and lay at the heart of our concept of 
participation in the life of the community and citizenship. He found that 
any exclusions from the general right to vote would have to have a 
rational connection with a legitimate objective,129 and that there the denial 
was arbitrary because it was not proportionate to a legitimate objective 
such that would justify the incursion on constitutional democratic 
rights.130 Gummow Kirby and Crennan JJ agreed the denial of voting 
rights to some individuals such as the appellant was not reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to the maintenance of representative 
government,131 noting the similarity of the test here with the second limb 
on the Lange test.132 
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 City of Chicago v Morales 527 US 41 (1999). 
126
 I don’t dwell here on an argument that there are some things that a government cannot 
criminalise, versus a positivistic argument that the government can criminalise anything it 
wishes, the very nature of what a criminal act is etc: see for example Stuart Green, ‘Why 
It’s A Crime To Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalisation and the Moral Content 
of Regulatory Offences’ (1997) 46 Emory Law Journal 1533; John Muncie and Eugene 
McLaughlin The Problem of Crime (2001); Robinson v California 370 US 660 (1962). 
127
 (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
128
 Gleeson CJ Gummow Kirby and Crennan JJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ dissenting. 
129
 Ibid 174. 
130
 Ibid 182. 
131
 Ibid. 202. 
132
 See above n 11 for an outline of the test. 
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The analogy is that the freedom to associate is also a fundamental part of 
the system of representative government enshrined by the Constitution. If 
freedom of communication is necessary for functional representative 
government, freedom to association is also necessary. When people 
associate, they communicate. A freedom to communicate, without the 
freedom to associate, would be an impoverished freedom. There is no 
good reason for denying that freedom to communicate includes an 
association freedom. What high constitutional purpose is served by 
recognising freedom to communicate, but not the ability to associate in 
order to communicate? It is also fundamental to ‘participation in the life 
of the community’, in the words of Gleeson CJ in Roach.  
As indicated above, there is a real practical benefit to recognising an 
implied freedom of association, quite separate from freedom of 
expression. According to existing High Court jurisprudence, a law which 
indirectly infringes freedom of political communication is easier to justify 
that one which does so directly. This can lead to perverse outcomes. For 
instance, consider a law which directly criminalises political association. 
According to existing principles, it is easier to justify, since it does not 
directly infringe political communication; it does so indirectly. Yet, 
surely such a law strikes at the heart of the representative and responsible 
government for which our Constitution provides. Recognition of freedom 
of political association as a fundamental principle of itself, related to but 
distinct from the implied freedom of political communication, would 
help. If that doctrine were recognised, a law which criminalised political 
association would be harder to justify, as a direct attack on the freedom, 
surely an improved position than existing doctrine where such a law 
would be easier to justify. 
While freedom of association is not absolute, a rational connection needs 
to be shown between the incursion on the freedom and a legitimate 
objective, and arbitrariness avoided. The blanket denial of the franchise 
there was not acceptable, though a more narrowly drawn limit taking into 
account the seriousness of the offence for which the person incarcerated 
would have been valid. The High Court has recently re-confirmed the 
validity of proportionality analysis,133 including the existence of less 
invasive means to achieve the legitimate objective,134 in relation to the 
implied freedom, as noted above. 
 Similarly here, a narrowly drawn incursion on the freedom to associate, 
based on evidence the individuals are consorting for criminal purposes 
may be valid. On the other hand, to criminalise association between an 
individual and two other individuals who have a criminal record, after 
having been warned off by police, is arbitrary and disproportionate to the 
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 Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [282] (Crennan Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
134
 Ibid [347]. 
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attainment of the legitimate objective (similar to the outcomes in Robel 
and Morales in the United States). Arguably, so is criminalisation of (and 
mandatory imprisonment for) the mere act of associating with other 
members of an organisation declared by the Queensland Government, as 
appears in s 60A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). Less invasive means 
are possible to secure the legitimate objective (similar to the outcome in 
Chief Constable of Gloucestershire in the United Kingdom). For instance, 
an offence based on evidence that two individuals were in fact consorting 
to plan criminal activity would be valid. 
VI SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It may be useful to summarise the essence of the argument here: 
• The High Court has repeatedly recognised an implied freedom of 
political communication based on the system of representative 
democracy for which the Constitution provides, and has found 
several laws to be invalid because they infringe that freedom in a 
way that is constitutionally offensive, having regard to the two-
limbed Lange test. 
• In these cases, several judges have acknowledged that the 
implied freedom of political communication includes the right to 
associate with others, at least for that purpose. It seems sensible 
that a freedom to communicate should encompass a right to 
associate, since communication often takes place during 
association. However, these comments are strictly obiter dicta; 
recognition of freedom of association has not yet been the basis 
of any High Court decision. 
• The High Court has dealt with legislation that is colloquially 
referred to as anti-association legislation, but those cases have 
been decided on other grounds. The Court did not find it 
necessary to consider the question of a constitutional freedom of 
association in those cases. 
• On first principles, theoretical writings regarding the rationale for 
and community benefits of freedom of speech tend to provide 
support for a freedom to associate as a necessary aspect of free 
speech. Such writings make no distinction between speech that is 
‘political’ and speech that is ‘non-political’. 
• United States First Amendment case law is highly relevant. 
Many of the Australian cases concerning the implied freedom of 
political communication, including the first case in which it was 
recognised in Australia, refer to the United States case law. 
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United States case law confirms that laws that literally create 
‘guilt by association’ are constitutionally unacceptable. 
• United States jurisprudence confirms that while association 
rights are not absolute, strong justification is required in order for 
laws impacting on such rights to be constitutionally acceptable. 
Specifically, proof of intent to commit an unlawful act is 
required. Blanket bans that take no account of the nature of a 
person’s actual involvement in an association have not been 
accepted. 
• European case law is similar, confirming that it is not consistent 
with the European Convention to arrest someone because of a 
fear they will commit violence. Past limiting of freedom of 
association to meetings that are ‘political’ in nature have been 
recently relaxed. 
• Applying this to the example of the current New South Wales 
consorting laws, firstly they make no exception for association 
that is purely for political purposes. This fact alone makes the 
laws highly vulnerable to constitutional challenge. The same can 
be said for the Western Australia and Northern Territory 
versions. With respect to the Victorian, South Australian and 
Tasmanian provisions, these laws don’t provide an exception for 
association for political purposes expressly, but do recognise 
something of a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence, which might be 
interpreted to include association for political purposes. 
• The context of the consorting laws highlight a problem with the 
jurisprudence in this area that has been obscured previously. In 
past cases, it has usually been clear that the party affected was 
involved in communication that was ‘political’. What was said 
was in the public domain. The assumption underlying this aspect 
of the Lange test, that it is possible and desirable to neatly divide 
communication which is ‘political’ and communication which is 
not ‘political’, is more difficult in the sphere of association, 
where the likelihood is that association occurs for a range of 
purposes, only some of which are political. The test can break 
down given the practical difficulty of separating occasions where 
an association is for political purposes, and when it is for non-
political purposes. This suggests that the current requirement, for 
the application of the implied freedom, that the communication 
be for ‘political’ purposes may require revisiting. This has 
occurred in Europe, and the requirement has been relaxed. 
• The New South Wales laws, together with the Western 
Australian and Northern Territory laws, make insufficient 
distinction between associations that are for innocent purposes, 
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and those that are for illicit purposes. Indiscriminatory laws of 
that nature have been found to be constitutionally unacceptable 
in the United States. A more tailored law might pass 
constitutional muster. This nuanced, non-absolutist view of 
freedom of communication is reasonably consistent with the 
second limb of the Lange test in Australia, and the Australian 
High Court should similarly find these laws objectionable for this 
reason. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Although some members of the High Court have expressed in two 
different lines of cases support for the existence of an implied freedom of 
political association, it has not yet formed the basis of any actual 
decision. It has been able to decide these cases on the (related) implied 
freedom of political communication, and the Kable principle. As a result, 
confirmation by a majority of the High Court on the existence of an 
implied freedom of association, at least for political purposes, is currently 
lacking.  
This paper has sought to re-assert the fundamental nature of such a right 
in a democracy such as Australia. It has drawn on theoretical writing 
reflecting the essentiality of such a freedom, and outlined how such 
freedoms have been upheld in comparable jurisdictions such as the 
United States and Europe. This wisdom raises several issues which the 
High Court will need to confront if it does accept freedom of association, 
including the continued viability of the current distinction between 
communication and association that is ‘political’, and communication and 
association that is not political. This distinction has not proven to be 
viable or useful elsewhere, and should be discarded here. This resolution 
will also have implications for the current doctrine of the implied freedom 
of ‘political’ communication. In the balancing required by the Lange test, 
the High Court would also need to consider the constitutional validity of 
laws implicating association which do not distinguish between 
association for proven sinister purposes, and association which may be 
for benign purposes, in terms of its proportionality and less drastic means 
principles as applied in the second limb of the Lange test.  
The paper has used consorting laws as the prime example of current laws 
that impact on the freedom of association. The High Court should accept 
the implied freedom of association, and then consider whether consorting 
laws are constitutionally invalid. Assuming that a similar version of the 
two-stage Lange test applied to freedom of communication would apply 
to freedom of association, these laws clearly have the potential to burden 
association that is ‘political’, , in relation to the first Lange limb. In 
considering the second limb, given the breadth of these laws, it is 
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concluded they may not be seen to be reasonably appropriate and adapted 
to the fulfilment of a legitimate objective in a manner consistent with 
representative and responsible government. The risk of a successful 
constitutional challenge is considered greatest with respect to the New 
South Wales, Western Australian and Northern Territory provisions. 
None of these laws provide a defence (directly or indirectly) to 
associations that are for purely political purposes, to take the narrowest 
view of the freedom. They are disproportionate in their impact and fail 
the less drastic means test, because they don’t distinguish between 
associations that may be for purely legitimate reasons, and associations 
with sinister overtones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
 
